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Abstract—The federation of Future Internet testbeds as 
envisaged by the Fed4FIRE project is a complex undertaking. It 
combines a large number of existing, independent testbeds in a 
single federation, and presents them to the experimenter as if it 
were a single infrastructure. Operating and using such an 
infrastructure requires a profound knowledge of the status of the  
health of the underlying independent systems. Inspired by 
network monitoring techniques used to operate the Internet 
today, this paper considers how a centralized health monitoring 
system can be set up in a federated environment of Future 
Internet Experimentation Facilities. We show why it is a vital tool 
for experimenters and First Level Support in the federation, 
which health monitoring information must be captured, and how 
this information can be displayed most appropriately. 
Keywords—Future Internet Experimentation Facilities, FIRE, 
Fed4FIRE, health monitoring, federation, support, operations 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A federation of Future Internet testbeds as envisaged by the 
Fed4FIRE project [1] is a complex undertaking [2]. It 
combines a large number of existing, independent testbeds in a 
single federation (see figure 1), and presents them to the 
experimenter as if it were a single infrastructure. But in reality 
no single entity owns or operates this entire federated testbed. 
Every testbed remains autonomous, deciding independently on 
its operational aspects such as maintenance, support, fault 
management, etc. You could compare this with how the 
Internet works. The Internet can be seen as a federation of 
independent networks (called autonomous systems), which 
decided to collaborate to create an enlarged and more 
performant network that they can offer to their local user base. 
An example of this is the pan-European research network 
where every country provides its own autonomous system 
(called a National Research and Education Network or NREN), 
which are interconnected with each other through the GÉANT 
network. To manage this complex federated network, both the 
NRENs keep track of the health status of their own network, 
but on the federated level additional monitoring is done by 
DANTE, which is responsible for the operation of the GÉANT 
network [3]. Given the clear resemblance between a federated 
network as exemplified by the Internet and the federation of 
Future Internet testbeds as envisaged by the Fed4FIRE project, 
adopting one of the Internet’s operational procedures within the 
federated testbed domain seems very sensible. As a result, 
health monitoring information should be made available both 
by the testbeds and the federation-level components. This 
requires some changes in the operational approach of these 
stakeholders. Today, testbed-specific operational procedures 
(including health monitoring, fault management and 
experimenter support) are typically quite informal, but are 
adequate in the context of providing the testbed to its local 
userbase. However, these mechanisms will not scale up when 
looking at federated operational models. For instance, when 
assessing if the federated infrastructure is up and running, it is 
not feasible to check the individual health information 
available at every testbed, and deduce the overall health status 
of the federated testbed manually. 
First Level Support (FLS) is the function responsible for 
maintaining the operation of the federation. FLS operators and 
other staff in charge of keeping the federation operational have 
to be able to respond quickly to any service interruption. They 
should therefore be able to retrieve overall health monitoring 
information in a very efficient manner. In a similar way, when 
experimenters face issues with experiments that unexpectedly 
malfunction, it is not straightforward for them to assess 
manually if the faults are related to problems with their specific 
experiment, or with the testbeds where it is deployed on. If the 
federation can provide an ‘easy to understand’ overview of the 
federation’s health status, this would allow the experimenter to 
assess if there is anything wrong with one or more of the 
testbeds belonging to the experiment. This would enable the 
experimenter to take preventative measures immediately (move 
the experiment to similar testbeds which are running smoothly, 
change the experiment design, postpone the experiment until 
the issues with the desired testbeds are resolved, etc.). 
However, at the moment it is unclear how such an overview of 
the federation’s health status can be realized. It is also 
unknown if such a system would be as useful in practice as it is 
in theory. Finding out the answers to these questions is exactly 
the scope of this paper. 
 Fig. 1. Overview of the 17 testbeds which are federated as part of Fed4FIRE 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In 
Section II we describe which design considerations were made 
to create the health monitoring system. In Section III we 
outline the practical implementation in Fed4FIRE. We then 
make an evaluation of the current setup in Section IV. We 
conclude with an outlook on the future work in Section V and a 
summary in section VI. 
II. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
It is not straightforward to determine the indicators that 
should be included in the health status information of the 
federated testbeds, or how they should be presented to the 
operators or experimenters. Experience gained from a similar 
federated operational environment in the sector of backbone 
networks made clear that the status information should be 
presented as concisely as possible. The form of a dashboard is 
deemed to be the most suitable for this. Typically operational 
dashboards indicate the health status of the monitored 
components using a Red/Amber/Green (RAG) color scheme. 
Adopting the same approach for the federation’s health status 
overview seems appropriate.  
Then the question remains: which information must be 
captured and displayed on this RAG dashboard? The example 
of the pan-European research network described in the 
introduction can be a useful source of inspiration. The health 
monitoring of that federated network of NRENs and the 
GÉANT interconnecting network is based on two different 
types of input: measurements coming from the NRENs 
themselves, and measurements specifically performed by the 
operator of the federated network. In the context of Fed4FIRE, 
this model would translate to a fusion of health monitoring data 
provided by the testbeds with specific federation-level health 
monitoring data.  
Based on the existing internal status monitors of the 
participating testbeds in Fed4FIRE, several possible indicators 
were investigated. In the end, five key indicators were 
identified which together give an overview of the status of each 
testbed. The indicators are spread across multiple layers of 
functionality. In case of a malfunction, this allows for a quick 
identification of where the problem is situated. The first three 
indicators are monitored by the federation: on the lowest level, 
network connectivity to the testbed is checked. Secondly, a 
simple query is performed to the testbed’s management server 
to check if it is up and running. The third indicator is the 
available resources present on the testbed. When no resources 
are available, swapping in a new experiment will fail. It is 
important for experimenters and FLS to be aware of this 
number, as making requests that exceed this resource limit is 
one of the most common reasons for an experiment to fail. The 
fourth key indicator is provided by the testbeds themselves: 
they must provide the centralized health monitor with an 
aggregated Red/Amber/Green internal status, which is directly 
displayed on the dashboard. Each testbed has the freedom to 
define for itself when its infrastructure should be considered to 
be in which of those three states. This can differ from testbed to 
testbed. The fifth indicator is the timestamp of when this 
aggregated internal status was refreshed for the last time. When 
this timestamp becomes too old, the information provided by 
 Fig. 2. Continuous Monitoring Dashboard as used by FLS within Fed4FIRE 
the testbed must be considered out-of-date, and typically 
indicates a malfunction of the testbed infrastructure.  
These five key indicators can together give a rather 
complete, composite overview of the health status of the 
federated testbeds, but an even more thorough indication of the 
testbeds’ health can be attained by performing automated 
scenario tests which go through all the steps of the 
experimental lifecycle.  As such tests require significantly more 
resources than continuous passive monitoring, the frequency of 
testing is much lower and they should only be executed during 
off-peak periods.  
III. IMPLEMENTATION IN FED4FIRE 
In Fed4FIRE, the health monitoring system currently 
consists of two components: a dashboard which continuously 
monitors the five identified key indicators, and an information 
panel with the latest status of each automated scenario test that 
is run within the federation. To limit the resource usage of 
these tests, they are run two times a day: once in the morning, 
and once in the evening, as these prove to be off-peak hours. 
However, when needed, an FLS operator can manually initiate 
an extra test run to check the status of the federation. 
A. Continous monitoring dashboard 
The dashboard that is currently in use in Fed4FIRE can be 
seen in figure 2. It is a service provided by the federation, and 
currently being maintained by iMinds. Each row contains the 
key indicators of a testbed, which are visually enriched by an 
automatically computed Red/Amber/Green (RAG) status. This 
allows operators to easily spot problematic values.  
An overview of the implementation of the health 
monitoring system is given in figure 3. Centrally within the 
system, all information is stored into a PostgreSQL-database. 
This database can be queried by the First Level Support 
dashboard, but can also be used for computing long-term 
statistics, generating e-mail alarms, etc.  
The information in this database is gathered by different 
components. The first component performs network 
connectivity tests to a testbed with an ICMP Echo-request 
(ping) to the Aggregate Manager (AM), which is the central 
management server of the testbed. This is the main server that 
is contacted for all requests originating from the federation to 
that testbed. When pinging this server fails, a general 
networking failure is the most likely cause. By monitoring the 
number of outages and the evolution of these round trip times, 
the quality of the connection to the testbed can also be 
evaluated. 
To fetch the second and third indicator, jFed[4] is used. 
This is a Java-based framework developed by iMinds which 
supports all API’s within the Fed4FIRE federation. It contains 
automated testing tools, a probe for manual testing and an end-
user experimentation-toolkit. By using this framework for 
health monitoring and end-user usage alike, we can verify and 
guarantee the correct functioning of the federation.  For the 
second key indicator, the jFed probe performs a basic 
information call (GetVersion) to the API of the testbed’s 
Aggregate Manager (AM). This call returns basic information 
about the testbed, such as supported protocols and internal 
software version information. A correct answer to this query is 
used as an indicator of whether the AM is up and responsive.  
One of the most useful parameters returned in this call is an 
identifier (codetag) of the testbed’s internal software version. 
When a problem arises, this identifier can be used to check 
whether the defect was introduced by an update of the testbed’s 
software. The third indicator is obtained by a ListResources-
call to the AM. From the result of this call, the number of 
available resources is calculated. These two indicators can also 
be used to verify that the federated authentication mechanism is 
functioning correctly. The ListResources-call requires valid 
authentication credentials, while these are not needed for the 
GetVersion-call. If jFed can successfully make the GetVersion-
call, but fails on the ListResources-call, this will typically 
indicate an authentication issue. 
The fourth indicator, the internal status of the testbed, is 
monitored by the facility monitoring of the testbed itself. Each 
testbed is expected to summarize its status into a 
Red/Amber/Green state, and push this status via an OML-
stream (Orbit Measurement Library-stream) [5] to an OML-
server of the federated health monitoring system. The testbed 
may also include additional information about the status of the 
different parts of the testbed’s system. This information can be 
different per testbed. For instance, the Virtual Wall testbed of 
iMinds makes use of specific VLAN-aware Ethernet switches 
to automatically emulate any desired resource topology. 
Fig. 3. Current Health monitoring infrastructure within Fed4FIRE 
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Therefore health information about these switches (on/off, 
network load per port, etc.) can be considered to be important 
when determining the health status of that testbed. While for a 
wireless testbed it might be more interesting to capture if there 
is too much wireless interference. But, independent of the 
actual captured data, providing information about the status of 
the different parts of the testbed’s system allows the testbed’s 
operational staff to give FLS and experimenters more insight 
into the current status of the testbed. All information pushed to 
the OML-server is captured in an OML-specific PostgreSQL 
database. From there it is processed and the aggregated RAG-
state, together with the timestamp of when the information was 
received, are inserted into the central health-monitoring system 
database. This gives us the fourth and fifth key indicator. Note 
that as mentioned before, every testbed can decide 
autonomously how its aggregate status has to be calculated. 
B. Automated scenario tests 
jFed is used to perform automated scenario tests. These 
scenarios perform all steps that are typically performed during 
an experiment. For each of these steps, all requests made and 
responses received are logged into a database. Each response is 
verified on several levels. First the response is checked against 
the protocol standards, and discrepancies are logged. Secondly, 
the response is matched against the expected outcome. In the 
case where the testbed replied with an error message, this 
check can be skipped. Finally, all necessary information is 
extracted to be able to perform the subsequent calls and/or 
check the outcome of those calls. All irregularities are logged 
according to their varying degrees of severity. In case of a fatal 
error, all dependent successive steps are discarded.  
The most important automated scenario tests that are 
currently in use perform setup-and-login tests on each testbed. 
In case of Fed4FIRE, which is designed around the Slice-based 
Federation Architecture (SFA), the test suite first acquires user 
credentials with sufficient rights to perform actions on the 
tested facility, and creates a new slice on the central Slice 
Authority (SA). Then the following steps are performed on the 
testbed under review: 
1. Request the supported protocols of the testbed’s 
Aggregate Manager (AM), and verify that all 
required protocols are listed. 
2. Allocate a sliver at the AM with one node. 
3. Provision the sliver on the testbed. 
4. Request the status of the sliver until the testbed 
indicates the sliver is swapped in. 
5. Request a description of the sliver. 
6. Log in onto the requested node through SSH, and 
request some basic system information. 
7. Remove the sliver from the testbed.  
 
Another type of automated scenario tests that is currently 
in use within Fed4FIRE tests the setup of experiments which 
construct layer 2-links between nodes on different testbeds. To 
achieve this, multiple VLAN’s on research networks such as 
those employing AutoBAHN [6] and Internet2’s  ION [7] are 
stitched together to achieve the layer 2-connectivity. In this 
test, for each combination of testbeds that support stitching the 
following steps are executed after creating a new slice on the 
central SA: 
1. Call the Stitching Computation Service (SCS) to 
receive instructions on how to setup a layer 2-link 
between the two testbeds.   
2. Allocate and provision a sliver with one node on each 
of the two testbeds. 
3. Follow the instructions of the SCS to configure the 
layer 2-link. 
4. Log in onto both nodes through SSH, and try to ping 
the other party. 
5. Remove the slivers from the testbed and destroy the 
layer 2-link. 
IV. EVALUATION 
The Fed4FIRE project includes three subsequent 
development cycles. The first of them ended on January 31st 
2014, meaning that the Fed4FIRE federation went operation 
for the first time on February 1st 2014. In order to prepare for 
this important milestone, the FLS services started operation on 
6th January 2014 and operated in a pilot mode for the remainder 
of that month so that the operations staff could gain ‘live’ 
experience of operating the service. For this they could rely on 
the health monitoring dashboard which is described in section 
III, a Trouble Ticket Service (TTS) based on the JIRA issue 
tracking software, and a shared calendar for the announcement 
of testbed maintenance. During the period January 6-31st, 25 
trouble tickets were opened. 23 of these were as a result of 
dashboard alarms detected by the FLS staff. There was one 
scheduled maintenance during the period. This illustrates that 
the federation’s health dashboard and underlying framework 
are essential components for the federation’s First Level 
Support service to guard the operational status of the entire 
federation. The 5 key indicators collected in the FLS 
dashboard, together with the more detailed information of the 
automated SSH login tests turned out to be providing sufficient 
health information. The use of the dashboard by FLS staff 
highlighted certain limitations relating to the way information 
is displayed, access to subsidiary information and ease-of-use 
to follow up alarms. These have been discussed with iMinds 
and a number of improvements are planned. Amongst other 
improvements, it will be made possible to query historical data, 
which will allow the FLS to gather trend information. 
Supplementary information will be made available, which will 
allow FLS operators to diagnose more accurately why a testbed 
is failing. To improve practical usability, FLS operators will be 
given the ability to post comments on the dashboard. Besides 
the technical remarks, the pilot also made clear that the 
operational processes of each testbed, such as the performance 
of urgent maintenance, need to be enhanced to notify the 
federation in order to prevent unnecessary action on alarms by 
the FLS. 
V. FUTURE WORK 
Currently, each testbed has its own infrastructure 
monitoring framework, and has complete liberty over how it 
provides information about the internal status of parts of the 
testbed. Efforts are ongoing to standardize which minimum 
information must be included in this breakdown.  
The feedback of the FLS operators is currently being 
processed. The dashboard is currently being enhanced to give 
access to the historical values of the key indicators. 
Later on, this historical data will be compiled into 
performance and reliability statistics that will be used to 
enforce SLA’s within the Fed4FIRE federation. These SLA’s 
are currently being drafted, and will also provide input for 
potential extra indicators that must be monitored. 
Furthermore, these statistics will be used to enhance end-
user tools of the jFed toolkit. By giving experimenters access to 
these statistics, they will be able to make an informed decision 
on which components suite their needs best. Moreover, the 
jFed toolkit will also be enhanced to collect metrics while 
actual experiments are being performed by the experimenters. 
Besides all these automatically gathered metrics, perceived 
performance and reliability will also be included into the 
metrics. This will be achieved by asking the end-user score his 
experiment after its conclusion. This extra information will 
then be used to further improve the formula with which the 
performance and reliability statistics are being computed. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The operational management of a federation of Future 
Internet Research Facilities is a challenging undertaking. This 
paper outlined how a centralized health monitoring system has 
the potential to ease the life of experimenters and facility 
providers alike. We analyzed which monitoring information 
was needed, and how it could be displayed in an effective 
fashion. This health monitoring system was then developed on 
the jFed framework, and is now running in production. After 
one month of usage, we learned that our health monitoring 
system is an important instrument to detect anomalies and 
improve the allover reliability within the federation. Only a few 
minor problems with the dashboard and underlying framework 
could be determined, and these are being addressed as soon as 
possible. 
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